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Anthropology and Emotion 
Emotion researchers, it is often said, irresistibly call to mind the fable of the blind 
men and the elephant, each right in his own way, none getting the whole beast 
(Russell 2003: 145). Where does emotion begin and end? Is it a matter of 
interpretation, feeling, category, situation, response, expression, or some or all of 
these? Perhaps there is no beast to capture and the ‘whole’ is a chimera: not an 
elephant but a unicorn. Yet the lack of palpable substance or enclosing skin, far from 
casting doubt on the enterprise, has spurred ever-greater efforts at definition and 
synthesis. The problem – the ‘blindness’ – is less in the selectivity than in the 
partiality that leads so often to the formula (always in protesting italics), ‘X is the 
emotion’. For William James (1884), our feeling of bodily change is the emotion; for 
the psychologist Nico Frijda (2004), it’s the “action tendency”; for the philosopher 
Robert Solomon (1993: 125), the judgment; and so on, through the many formulas – 
of facial expression, semantic structure, and discourse – that make similar claims of 
equivalence. The definitional problem can’t be made to go away by putting all the 
parts together, because the parts may be only contingently related; some parts may be 
more essential than others (an elephant is still an elephant without its tail); and, of 
course, there are feelings, judgments, action programmes, scenarios, and facial 
expressions that aren’t emotional. So how to tell which ones are? That very basic 
question, still lacking a conclusive answer in psychology and philosophy, is 
interestingly complicated by research in other societies. Away from home, not only 
do our common-sense judgments about what counts as emotion falter: their 
uncertainty weakens the conceptual basis of the judgments themselves. So a new 
difficulty arises: what to do about exceptions. Durkheim liked to argue that one well-
founded ethnographic case could prove a general sociological law. More plausibly, 
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Margaret Mead held that one solid exception was enough to confound a universal 
claim. Her easygoing Samoans forever altered adolescence; her Tchambuli jumbled 
gender. The celebrated counter-examples – Tahitians, Ifaluk, Ilongot, and Utku – have 
all posed challenges of this kind. What becomes of hard-wired emotions if the 
Tahitians don’t feel sad or the Eskimo don’t get angry?  
      As the questions suggest, anthropology’s contribution to the understanding of 
emotion has been both descriptive and critical; in the best cases ethnography and 
critique are two sides of the same coin. In the work of Levy (1973, 1984), Lutz 
(1988), White (1994), and Shweder (1994), the comparison implicit in any fieldwork 
account is raised to a theoretical level, as imported categories are made to confront 
awkward facts. In different ways, these authors have shown that emotions are 
inextricable elements of thinking, speaking, and acting; and that we ignore them at 
our peril.  
       For most of our discipline’s brief history, however, emotion has not been a 
theoretical focus. Its integrity as a concept has been assumed, its cross-cultural 
identity taken for granted, its empirical role in social processes either scorned or 
obscurely acknowledged as fundamental. Not so much ‘the blind men and the 
elephant’ – which suggests at least a groping interest – as ‘the elephant in the room’. 
The centrality of emotion in human life is part of its elephant-like invisibility. 
Imposing but oddly intangible, neither out there nor in here, all-important or totally 
irrelevant: no wonder we anthropologists have difficulties with our emotions. The 
difficulties, I shall argue, are conceptual and methodological, and, like many of the 
most taxing issues in anthropology, they are perennial. So the selective history I begin 
with is of more than antiquarian interest: it identifies problems and positions that 
remain starting points for any discussion. I shall be tracing a history of neglect that 
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runs counter to the progress achieved in other anthropological fields – a story of 
missed opportunities and roads not taken; all, of course, retraced with the comfort of 
hindsight. But there’s no room for smugness: this is the testament of a repentant 
sinner. 
       I shall be addressing two separate but related problems: on the one hand, a patchy 
recognition of emotion, often amounting to neglect; on the other, a failure in 
reporting, a critical lack of detail. One can underrate emotion by ignoring it, or one 
can underrate it by putting it in the wrong words, letting it slip through the gaps. If the 
problems are related, so are the solutions. To give emotion its due, to restore the 
heartbeat to ethnography, we have to think harder about what goes on in the field and 
how best to put experience into words. 
1
 
       Now, as every student knows, the modern tradition of fieldwork-ethnography was 
more or less founded by Malinowski. In the manifesto-like introduction to Argonauts 
of the Western Pacific (1922), he made a distinction between the collection of data 
about social organization and the ‘imponderabilia of actual life’ – the moment-by-
moment flow of behaviour which the anthropologist was uniquely able to record. To 
grasp the imponderabilia, and through them, the ‘native point of view’, you had to 
come down off the verandah, the creaking stage of old-style fieldwork interviews, to 
observe speech in its living context. It was the newly-discovered, or at least newly-
theorized, method of participant-observation that revealed to Malinowski the critical 
contrast between what people do and what they say or think they do. The method 
emphasized what Roger Sanjek, in a review of fieldwork practices, calls ‘situated 
listening’ and ‘speech-in-action participant-observation’ (1990: 233), as opposed to 
‘formal interviews with seated informants’ (246). We must bear this crucial contrast 
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in mind in assessing recent studies of emotion. All too often we have forgotten the 
lesson of the master.     
      The extraordinarily rich descriptions that Malinowski produced would not have 
been possible without his clearly articulated discovery of ‘subject, method, and 
scope’, as his first chapter is entitled. However, what worked for the kula did not 
work quite so well for emotion. Consider a well-known example, cited by his 
biographer as a prototype of the extended-case method; an example so dear to 
Malinowski’s heart that he reproduced it with little alteration from his fieldnotes in 
two separate accounts (Young 2004: 402). This was the story of the expulsion of the 
chief’s son, Namwana Guya’u, from Omarakana. Namwana had accused his rival, the 
chief’s sister’s son, of seducing his wife and had reported him to the colonial resident. 
The outrage that followed the seducer’s imprisonment led to Namwana’s formal 
denunciation and exile. For village and ethnographer the consequences were 
momentous: the loss of an influential man and key informant, the chief’s semi-
withdrawal from active life, the grief-stricken death of his wife, and a ‘deep rift in the 
whole social life of Kiriwina’ (Malinowski 1926: 105). Michael Young reads in 
Malinowski’s account the sympathy of one interloper for another. Both men lacked 
rights in the village (in the system of matriliny, the chief’s son had rights only in his 
mother’s natal village) and were dependent on chiefly patronage; both were at the 
mercy of colonial power, Malinowski as a wartime ‘enemy alien’, Namwana as a 
native subject. Parallels aside, Malinowski presents the case in structural terms as a 
struggle between mother-right and father love, matrilineal authority and paternal 
interest (1929: 13). The personal elements that would thicken the meaning – 
character, dialogue, development – are edited out. You can’t blame him for seizing 
the opportunity to clinch a decisive sociological point. But the emotions – the 
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imponderabilia – have been filtered. The back-story is summary; the description 
sparse. His hero and literary model, Joseph Conrad, would not have approved. It 
would be good to know what the participants felt: felt in the fullest sense – how they 
judged the events; how public humiliation affected the imprisoned philanderer and the 
well-born cuckold; how the longstanding feud between them stoked anger and 
retribution; how the linking but invisible women – the chief’s sister and the unfaithful 
wife – judged the unfolding situation and were reconciled with the warring men; and 
how, emotionally and linguistically, the whole thing was framed by differently 
positioned parties. The sociological case is nailed, trophy-like, for future admiration; 
but we learn little from this account about the way emotions are constituted or 
experienced in an exotic setting. We can see they matter a good deal; but the method 
of reporting does not let us see how or why they matter.  
       Nor do we learn much from similar fieldwork cases of Malinowski’s student 
Raymond Firth, an equally copious ethnographer who limited his coverage of emotion 
because of a preconception about what might count as psychology. In documenting 
what he calls family sentiments, Firth warns with a shudder: ‘But the use of the term 
“sentiment” in this book [We, the Tikopia] implies not a psychological reality but a 
cultural reality; it describes a type of behaviour which can be observed, not a state of 
mind which must be inferred’ (1936/1957: 160). To be fair, a late essay (Firth 1985), 
delivered on Malinowski’s centenary, does directly address an emotional episode, 
another case of a chief’s distraught son. But Firth’s analysis, which concerns 
intelligibility, gets stuck on the binaries of reason and affect, verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour, rationality and irrationality; it doesn’t tell us much about emotion, or 
indeed Tikopia emotion. And I say this in spite of Michael Carrithers’ otherwise 
persuasive appreciation of the case, which he incorporates into a powerful argument – 
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very much to my taste - for the narrative understanding of behaviour (Carrithers 1992: 
159-160). 2 By and large, emotions were just too imponderable for functionalist 
methodology; they escaped the subject, method and scope.  
      On the other theoretical wing, one foot on the verandah, Radcliffe-Brown and 
his followers also shied away from a fuller exploration of naturally-occurring 
emotions, preferring what they termed social sentiments, the culturally standard 
dispositions appropriate to a son or daughter, chief, rival, or ally. These 
sentiments were cast in simple terms as solidarity, hostility, affection, and 
respect unmixed with idiosyncrasy, temperament, or curriculum vitae. The 
structural functionalists followed Durkheim in their ruthless purging of 
individual psychology. ‘Psychological facts’ had no bearing on ‘social facts’, which 
were the sole concern of sociology and anthropology.  
          French structuralism took up a different strand of the legacy but kept the 
taboo. Lévi-Strauss went even further than Durkheim in rejecting any 
explanatory role for emotions. ‘Actually, impulses and emotions explain nothing: 
they are always results, either of the power of the body or of the impotence of 
the mind. In both cases they are consequences, never causes. The latter can be 
sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern of biology, or in the 
intellect, which is the sole way offered to psychology, and to anthropology as 
well’ (1962: 71). A strict Cartesian dualism prevented him from seeing emotions 
as having any cognitive content, or, to put it slightly differently, intellect as 
embodied (1981: 667-8); which meant omitting the motivations, judgments, 
tactics, and expressions that comprise emotions and animate social life. For Lévi-
Strauss, emotions are mere effects. Yet in the flow of events, effects are causes of 
further effects. Emotions, moreover, have motivational value: we seek pleasure, 
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avoid pain. Even granted a narrow view of emotions as sentiments, Lévi-Strauss 
cut out much of what the ethnographer can observe. Since he relied mainly on 
published texts rather than fieldnotes, his examples are doubly depleted. It was 
only a small step from the functionalist schemas he drew upon to an algebraic 
notation of dispositions, with positive and negative values. This was kinship 
drained of human significance. In a generation, anthropology had passed from 
Malinowski’s exuberant realism, in which people and their emotions were highly 
visible, if not a focus in themselves, to a plane of abstraction which left them far 
behind.  
       As the home of what became psychological anthropology, America was more 
hospitable to emotion. Built on the massive corpus of Boasian descriptive 
ethnography, American anthropology made culture, not society or the individual, 
its cornerstone. Boas himself was keen to distinguish culture as a historical 
product from individual thought and feeling. Above an assumed ‘psychic unity of 
mankind’, what varied across cultures was the content of cognitions, not the 
faculties or forms of experience  (Shore 1996: 22). Boas would not have agreed 
with his distant heirs that ‘emotional experience is not precultural but 
preeminently cultural’ (Lutz 1988:5), that the passions, quite simply, are 
‘cultural’ (Geertz 1980: 124). Although his students – the Culture and Personality 
pioneers – saw emotion as a key variable in a design for living, they took for 
granted the conception of emotion and its objective status as a natural kind. 
Their concern was not with what emotions were but what they did; how they 
were shaped by everyday routines; how they moulded the ethos.  
       The attempt to pin feelings to forms was most explicit in Bateson’s Naven 
(1958), an ambitious synthesis of British structural and American cultural 
 8 
approaches. Bateson analyzed stereotyped sequences in Iatmul encounters, 
coining the term schismogenesis for the competitive escalation and breakdown 
between partners. Schismogenesis, he proposed, was a widespread form of 
interaction evident in marital squabbles, class war, even the arms race. 
Curiously, in Bali where he later worked, it was lacking. Instead, a tendency to 
excite then dissipate emotion - an ‘absence of climax’ - led to what he and Mead 
(1942) called a schizoid personality. On almost every measure Bali was different 
(in emotion studies it’s the perennial exception, the view from Mars); but no less 
than in the Sepik, Balinese emotions, daily routines, and cultural values were 
tightly interlinked in a functional circuit.  
        All this clarity came at a cost. A focus on patterns and processes destroyed 
the specificity of emotion episodes, winnowing out the passionate individual, 
turning the love and anger of real people into the synthetic passions of generic 
Balinese, Papuans, and Samoans: culture-specific, not person-specific, emotions. 
Despite its gossipy tone and one’s memory of it as rich in emotions, Mead’s 
Samoa book contains not a single description of an emotional sequence 
witnessed by the author. The technique is one of ethnographic generalization – 
‘Cases of passionate jealousy do occur, but they are matters for extended 
comment and amazement’ (1972:131) – or summary: ‘The rage of Lola was 
unbounded and she took an immediate revenge, publicly accusing her rival of 
being a thief and setting the whole village by the ears’ (145). The manner – 
discursive, undramatic in the strict sense - sacrifices verisimilitude for 
presentational coherence. 
        Naven, one of anthropology’s Great Books, illustrates the gains and losses of 
pigeonholing emotions. I cite it here because the balance sheet is still relevant 
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and because Bateson was unusually - obsessively - reflexive in his approach and 
knew very well what he had to leave out. Here we find, more starkly formulated, 
the peculiar relation between reporting, circumstance and summary that 
Malinowski had developed and that generations of anthropologists came to 
adopt – at a price - as ethnographic method. In his introduction Bateson asks 
how the ethnographer can capture scientifically what literature conveys by 
‘impressionistic’ techniques. ‘The emotional background,’ he writes, ‘is causally 
active within a culture, and no functional study can ever be reasonably complete 
unless it links up the structure and pragmatic working of the culture with its 
emotional tone or ethos’ (1958:2). But his focus is on formalized behavior and 
sentiments; and his argument, frustrating and dazzling by turns, succeeds only to 
the extent that he can persuade us such sentiments do indeed dominate Iatmul 
life. From the evidence, we cannot know. Naven is famously theory-driven, with 
Bateson a kind of anti-Malinowski, herding the facts like docile sheep from one 
hypothetical fold to another. But among the confining frames there are glimpses 
of stray facts, unformulated emotions – the feelings behind the ‘emotional 
background’, one might say. Bateson witnesses a funeral and puzzles over the 
half-hearted sobbing of the men and their relieved lapse into competitive 
boasting. ‘They escaped entirely from a situation which was embarrassing,’ he 
writes, ‘because it seemed to demand a sincere expression of personal loss, an 
expression which their pride could scarcely brook’ (154). Ethos triumphs over 
inchoate feeling. But the psychic cost, like the peculiar ambivalence Bateson 
found in Iatmul sexual antagonism, remains unexplored. How are unauthorized 
emotions experienced? What subterranean life do they lead? How does the 
personal trauma of initiation get transformed into the ‘pride of the male ethos’? 
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Legitimate anthropological questions: but they could not be asked when the 
object of enquiry was ‘culturally standardized behavior’. 
         Emotion’s multidimensionality makes it a casualty of any ‘systems’ 
approach. Subordinate a feeling to a system and you lose the interplay between 
contexts - cultural, social, and biographical – that gives emotions their resonance, 
their practical significance. In fact, the more analytical one’s approach, the 
sharper the definitions, the vaguer the emotion concept. Which suggests we are 
either victims of a category mistake or of false precision (Averill 1994: 145).  
        Functionalism and structuralism reduced emotions to dispositions, shadows 
of structure.  In Talcott Parsons’ mid-century rethinking of the social sciences, 
emotion was even more elusive. Parsons’ maxim was the irreducibility of 
psychological, sociological, and cultural phenomena, each ‘level’ having its own 
characteristics (Kuper 1999: chap. 2). In the division of labour, anthropologists 
were assigned ‘culture’, sociologists ‘society’, and psychologists ‘personality’. But 
where did emotion belong? Each scholarly tribe could claim emotion as its own 
only by losing two of the dimensions. For the anthropologists, it had to be 
cultural or nothing. But what was emotion torn from its psychological moorings?  
        The answer came in a different conception of emotion, one that better fitted 
the cultural mould. If human beings were cultural beings, as Parsons’ chief 
anthropological exponent argued, so must their emotions be cultural. ‘Not only 
ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts’, wrote Clifford Geertz in 1962 
(1973: 81). This was a radical claim, far from the dilute Freudianism that had 
cramped the Culture and Personality school. But in its strong sense it was not 
picked up for many years, not even by Geertz himself. In this early essay, Geertz 
was moving towards the idea of culture as a tissue of symbols. He later gave 
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philosophical ballast to the conception by appeal to Wittgenstein’s strenuously 
public concept of meaning, for which the axiom ‘an “inner process” stands in 
need of outward criteria’ (1958: 153) might serve as banner. In the Bali essays of 
the 1960s and 70s, however, emotions appear as manipulable entities, 
psychological ready-mades rather than cultural artifacts. Here’s an example. 
‘What the cockfight says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment – the thrill of risk, 
the despair of loss, the pleasure of triumph…. Attending cockfights and 
participating in them is, for the Balinese, a kind of sentimental education’ (1973: 
449). This is not very different from Bateson and Mead on Bali. Culture shapes 
what nature provides. What’s new is the text analogy, the idea that the parade of 
emotions forms a social commentary, a native sociology.  
       We are a long way from the thrusting individuals of Argonauts or Crime and 
custom, far removed from real imponderable emotions. Which is no doubt what 
Geertz intends. His Balinese are constructed, faceless, generic. But so the culture 
had made them: they lacked individuated personalities, were scarcely 
differentiated by name, and existed in ‘a motionless present, a vectorless now’ 
(404). In a Platonic inversion of ethnographic perception, he writes (in a later 
essay): ‘It is dramatis personae, not actors, that endure: indeed it is dramatis 
personae, not actors, that in the proper sense really exist’ (1983: 62). Emptied of 
subjectivity and history, Balinese fulfilled the interpretive ideal, epitomizing 
texts, acting out categories, valorizing the method. No need for narrative context 
or even ordinary off-the-verandah observation. In their thoughts and emotions, 
Balinese were as symbol-bound, as suspended in webs of meaning, as Radcliffe-
Brown’s mother’s brother had been functional in his. Reality fitted theory hand 
in glove.  
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       Geertz’s bracketing of the biographical, his focus on the public forms of 
knowledge, on cultural framing rather than subjective qualia, set the course for a 
generation. Anything outside this programme amounted to mind-reading. 
Interpretivism inspired many fine-grained accounts of the person that enriched 
the literature but left out actual persons. It was as if the symbols and models had 
the experiences on the actor’s behalf. What was left over when texts had been 
interpreted and symbols logged was private sensation, amenable to neither 
observation nor analysis. In this perspective, individuality was equated with 
privacy (in the philosophical sense), an anthropological no-man’s-land.  
        Such was the orthodoxy as constructionism took hold from the 1980s, 
heralded twenty years earlier by Geertz’s claim that emotions were cultural 
artifacts. Contrary voices arguing for transcultural factors lingered here and 
there. Renato Rosaldo (1989) and Unni Wikan (1994) argued from common 
experience (an approach treated sceptically in Beatty 2005a, 2010). 
Phenomenological anthropologists continued to assert the primacy of the body, 
the experiencing self, or other avatars of consciousness. But the dominant modes 
remained the summary report, the case study fitted to a thesis, the colourful 
vignette, and the generalizing, comparative statement.             
Despite a century of progress on other fronts, a tendency toward the generic – 
the death of emotion – has persisted practically unchanged up to the present. I 
will come to the exceptions, but among several objections two are paramount, 
and it is worth spelling them out at this half-way mark. The first objection to 
generic reporting or explanation goes as follows. Emotions might be third-
person constructions, a collective product, but they are first-person experiences 
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and not reducible to any of their ingredients. Their particularity is to do with 
their subjectivity, their me-focus (Barrett et al. 2007; Goldie 2000; Roberts 1988; 
Solomon 1993). Unlike most other things that are in some sense culturally 
constructed - norms, values, cultural models - their sine qua non is their personal 
reference. You feel anger because it is you who is insulted; sad because the loss is 
yours. Others may read the situation in similar terms, recognizing the loss or 
insult, but they don’t experience the emotion. Emotions are particular or they are 
nothing. As psychologists have long recognized, an adequate account of emotion 
has to reckon with this primary fact. It is the first objection to a generalizing 
format.  
        The second is that emotions are biographical: primed by evolution, to be 
sure; shaped by culture; constrained by subject position; but given personal 
relevance and intensity by individual history. Psychoanalysts have long made 
this claim; but it finds powerful new support in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience. To quote one recent study, ‘an emotion experience is a conceptual 
structure stored in memory whose conditions include current perceptions, 
cognitions, actions, and core affect. A specific emotion conceptualization (e.g., a 
context-specific conceptualization of anger) … reinstates how these conditions 
have been experienced in the past’ (Barrett et al 2007: 386).  Clearly, a view that 
opens the way to a narrative account of the sort I want to promote here. This 
biographical kind of particularity is not quite the same as the first, the quality of 
reflexivity or self-reference. It has to do with the fact that nobody else can lead 
my life: my biography, memories, and psychological formation are my own.  
These personal circumstances, built over time, sedimented in character and 
temperament, affect - not to say determine - emotional experience and the 
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course of relations between people. A psychoanalyst would say as much. But for 
the anthropologist this biographical story is not purely internal or individual, 
much less isolable from the living context. What counts here is the embedding of 
emotion in interwoven lives, not its remembrance in the bubble of an interview.  
        These two sorts of particularity, the egocentric and the biographical (both of 
them resistant to a generalizing format), pose different implications for the 
ethnographer. They represent the inner and outer dimensions of experience: 
consciousness, on the one hand; lives and histories on the other. They are 
filtered out by any systems approach that fails to connect the cultural, social, and 
psychological, and that removes emotion from the stream of history. By this 
measure, an account framed in terms of cultural categories, scripts, social 
tensions, emotion display rules, or any other synchronic or schematic analysis 
will fall short.  
       An example might be Lutz’s Unnatural emotions (1988), which depends on 
the analysis of emotion terms excerpted from minimally contextualised episodes, 
interviews, and word-sorting tests. The vast irregular hinterland of meaning that 
inheres in past experiences, personal confrontations, non-linguistic behaviour, 
and unvoiced reflection is hidden in a method that prioritises and isolates verbal 
performance and stereotypical script-definition.  Like Mead’s Samoa book, 
Unnatural emotions lacks detailed descriptions of emotion episodes; the 
ethnographer’s advantage sacrificed for argument’s sake. One could say the same 
of another landmark discourse study, Michelle Rosaldo’s Knowledge and Passion 
(1980), whose first sixty or so pages avoid extended examples - except for a 
single brilliant fieldwork anecdote (33-4) that upsets the argument by placing 
ethnographer and subjects within a layered story. Instead of naturalistic 
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episodes illustrating Ilongot emotions, Rosaldo strings together sayings and 
usages put to her as Ilongot (in a telling formula) ‘explain themselves’ (36). Thick 
commentary rather than thick description. Only thus can she claim that ‘Their 
talk of hearts has less to do with histories that give reasons than with the fact 
that hearts that stand apart are “moved”, “turn in upon themselves”, “itch”,’ etc. 
(1980:43), the vocabulary comprising a static folk psychology, not a history of 
persons. How could it be otherwise when the method precludes ‘histories’ and 
emphasizes instead the alienness of Ilongot emotions?  
       One test of any anthropological account is a simple but seldom asked 
question: If I were that person or belonged to that set of people, would the 
analysis include what seems most significant to me?3 Is my anger fully explained 
by my structural position as a slighted Mother’s Brother, or by its place within a 
contrast set of emotion categories, or by its expression as a human universal? 
None of the above. Positioning, expression, strategy, and circumstances frame 
the context and possibilities; but what gives the context resonance – in effect, 
what produces the emotion as a self-referring, biographical event - is its location 
in time among figures with similarly distinctive but interlaced histories. This is 
what ethnography has to reckon with.  
          The analogy with drama is suggestive. The significance of a Hamlet 
soliloquy depends not only on semantic meaning but on the orientation of 
characters, the state of the plot, and the possibilities ahead: half the speeches are 
about action or inaction. An ethnographer in Elsinore had better not rely on 
semi-structured interviews (‘Hamlet, what makes you depressed?’) or word-
sorting tasks (‘Claudius, list synonyms for guilt.’); or, having convened a friendly 
focus group beneath the battlements, hypothetical scenarios (‘Let’s talk about 
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our mothers’). Confronted with the standard instruments of emotion research, 
do our informants, like Hamlet, feel a little out of joint? They gamely answer, but 
what are their answers worth? At some abstract level we might learn something 
about how people think about emotions in interviews, but not how they think or 
feel in practice; much less how emotions occur, are subjectively experienced, 
how they filter, frame or direct sequences of action.  
       We have identified the problem – a failure either to recognize or adequately 
report emotion – but are no nearer a solution. A parallel with a classical 
discussion points the way. For Aristotle the chief device by which the drama 
elicits emotions is plot. It is through the unfolding of action that emotion is not 
simply represented but produced. The audience undergoes the fear and pity of 
tragedy by witnessing the events on stage. (Aristotle [2001: 96] singles out 
reversal of fortune and recognition as the most emotive plot elements.) But plot 
is only one dimension. In a well-constructed drama, plot is the revelation of 
characters in interaction. What befalls the tragic hero is a function of his flawed 
make-up. For Henry James (1884/1972: 37) this equation is the engine of fiction. 
‘What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the 
illustration of character?’  
       In the looser weave of ordinary life extraneous factors intervene. Stuff 
happens. The procession of events doesn’t run on the rails of character but 
expresses the vast complexity of the world, of which we know only our own little 
corner. Most realist fiction - James notwithstanding - is a compromise between 
the poetic compression of the stage and the ungraspable complexity of offstage 
reality. Narrative plausibility depends entirely on the plot-character mechanism, 
so that what people say and do follows from the past without being entirely 
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predictable. But plausibility isn’t verisimilitude. (A melodrama may be plausible 
within generic conventions but lack verisimilitude.) What makes a fiction seem 
true, rather than merely plausible, is its representativeness, the reader’s sense of 
its fidelity to experience of the external world.  
       In most ethnography, plausibility and verisimilitude are differently 
constructed. Lacking a narrative perspective, you don’t ask yourself, ‘Would this 
person do that, given what we know about her?’ but ‘Would she do that given the 
cultural premises?’ Ethnographic plausibility is about logical consistency. 
Verisimilitude is harder to specify. When Levy (1973: 304) tells us of a Tahitian 
man, abandoned by his wife, who felt not sad but sluggish and ill, the account is 
plausible, given the premises (no explicit concept of sadness, a resistance to 
negative emotions), but without narrative background it remains, to me at least, 
mysterious. Levy (1984), whose background is psychoanalytical and who staged 
psychodynamic interviews in the field, sees such cases as culturally shaped 
misrecognition, so that a loss that we should associate with sadness is 
experienced as fatigue. Misrecognizing emotion is a common enough event. But 
the fatigue following loss of a spouse is surely unlike the fatigue following a day 
digging taro. Levy’s account requires the Tahitian to misconstrue not only his 
sadness but also his tiredness. It may be that Tahitians don’t mentalise the bodily 
feelings that accompany an appraisal of loss; that they don’t dwell on the loss. Or 
to use Shweder’s (1994) term, they don’t emotionalise the feeling. But only an 
account with time-depth and biographical density could justify such a claim.  
         If plausibility depends on internal consistency, one of the ways in which 
verisimilitude – especially in the reporting of emotions - is enhanced is through 
inconsistency, the out-of-character lapse, the capacity to do things that surprise. 
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Real human beings surprise us not just because we are fallible observers but 
because we don’t have access to all the facts: the secret histories and evolutions 
of motive that underlie behaviour. This hidden aspect is especially significant in 
emotion because of its reflexivity and partial privacy; and the point holds even in 
societies where the individual soul is not a matter of much interest. I think back 
to an event during my fieldwork in Nias, an island in Indonesia. After a thirty-
year reign, the chief of my host village had died - a prolonged, public passing that 
was welcomed - and regretted - as the end of an era. In the hall of the great house 
that was the hub of village life he lay in his coffin, surrounded by relatives, 
dressed for eternity. As clansmen gathered to pay their respects and air their 
grievances, the seniors rose one by one to make speeches. The chief’s great rival, 
his deputy, who had awaited this moment for half a life, got up to speak. He was 
the leading orator, a master of staged emotion: people watched his face and hung 
on his voice, expecting him to put their feelings into words. But how to strike the 
right note: magnanimous but not triumphant, compassionate but gently critical - 
as form required, since the spirit’s path to the otherworld is blocked by unvoiced 
resentment? And how would he conceal a lifetime of envy beneath the grudging 
admiration? He hailed the crowd and began, then – seconds into his speech - his 
chin dropped and the words choked. Instead of the usual passionate flow, a 
strangled cry. Stranger still was the effect of his appearance. There was 
something different about him that I only twigged when I noticed the chief’s 
older brother, another grizzled veteran. Using a homemade concoction of boot 
polish and turps, both men, overnight, had dyed their hair jet black; both 
uncannily rejuvenated by the chief’s death. I cannot separate the peculiar 
emotional tone of this transformation from its symbolism and the situation that 
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evoked it. The occasion demanded sorrow, and half found it in the deputy’s 
stifled sob; but the checked words and the youthful appearance suggested 
liberation, perhaps even elation in his rival’s passing. The black hair was a 
personal symbol; one that the audience registered but whose meaning could not 
be spelled out. The disturbing transformation was repeated a year later when, 
hours after a murderous clash between his lineage mates (both rivals for his 
land), the same deputy marched through the village in tennis shorts. It would be 
trivializing to call it a fashion statement; but the deputy’s white shorts and pale 
unsunned legs had a startling effect on the villagers who had only ever seen him 
in sombre sarong or trousers. Everyone knew he had been the intended victim; 
everyone could see he had profited from the murder. But why the parade? With 
one rival killed and another led away to justice, what was he playing at? I saw it 
as a gesture of defiance, a triumph not only over his enemy, but over death; for 
his enemy – like the grim reaper - had been stalking him, dagger in hand, for 
days.  
        A narrative of the fieldwork would have to make something of these oddities 
– the black hair and the white shorts - precisely because they fall outside 
ethnographic stereotype. Closer to parapraxis than praxis, they tell us nothing 
general; but therein lies their significance. They remind us that the occasion, 
expression, and meaning of emotion are personal and particular (there being no 
such thing as a general emotion); and that emotions focus a range of concerns, 
which is why they are anthropologically interesting. In fact, no synthetic example 
or capsule summary could tell us half so much about power and status in Nias as 
emotion-laden incidents of this kind. To make proper sense of them I’d have to 
unravel a history of reversals and humiliations. I’d spool back twenty years to 
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the deputy’s wedding day, when the chief had barred the door of the great house 
to him, turning him away with a foul oath. I’d recover the tale – scarcely 
mentionable – of how his mother had been abducted on a headhunting raid and 
had married into the chief’s lineage, a slave become a bride. I’d retrace the 
stories of how he had subsidized the bridewealth of his nephew, the future 
murderer; and of the resentment that had grown between them until the day fate 
had placed the wrong victim in the way. I might not come away with a 
hypothesis, but I’d have a better understanding of the play of emotion, the 
twisting together of envy, resentment, and revenge; and of how the little, half-
intended details mean everything. This would not be a psychoanalytic history; 
instead it would return to the broad context which has a powerful transpersonal 
reality: perspectival, but not purely egocentric, historical but not stratigraphic in 
the Freudian manner; a story embedded in other stories. 
       It’s the pressure of the past – the traces of previous encounters in memory, 
dispositions, expectations, and grey hairs – that make for what E. M. Forster 
(1962) called round characters: individuals with depth, agency, and the capacity 
to surprise. And it's the time-dimension provided by narrative that conveys 
reality.  
         If the aim is to be true to life – and what else is there to be true to? - most of 
us can probably think of ethnographic examples that have the right qualities. 
(Unfortunately, narrative ethnography, prolix by definition, is not susceptible to 
capsule summary.) My own list would include Abu-Lughod (1993), Jackson 
(2004), Read (1965), Scheper-Hughes (1992), Stoller and Olkes (1989), Vitebsky 
(2005), and Wikan (1990); with Briggs (1970) especially impressive on emotion. 
But I want to cite a fictional example because it brings out all of the elements of 
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emotion that only an omniscient narrator can capture but from which 
nevertheless ethnographers can learn. Here we have the elephant from trunk to 
tail: the eliciting situation and perception; the social framework and self-
interested involvement; the values that frame judgment; the dialectic of 
interpretation and affect; the layered time perspective; the bodily arousal and 
facial expression (spontaneous, managed); the elusive relation between 
experience and emotion category; and the implications for action. (Let anyone 
who thinks emotions are no more than feelings ponder that list.) In the episode, 
which I can only sample here, all these elements are anatomized; but what’s 
most compelling is the careful sequencing of perception, interpretation, arousal, 
reflection, expression and action. Nothing is taken for granted.  
        The episode, loosely based on a real event, is from Tolstoy’s novel, 
Resurrection (1899/1962). A nobleman, the wealthy Prince Nekhluyov, is 
summoned as a juror. In court he unexpectedly confronts in the dock a woman 
whom he had seduced as a youth ten years earlier and whose life he has 
thoughtlessly ruined. Once an innocent domestic servant, now a prostitute, 
Maslova is on trial for killing one of her clients. Nekhluyov recognizes her, and 
his thoughts race back to their earlier affair. But she seems not to know him. We 
follow the prince’s thoughts in silent commentary on proceedings, but the 
narrator doesn’t name his emotions, noting only that he has difficulty breathing. 
When the examination begins, Nekhluyov ‘stared at Maslova, while a complex, 
painful process took place in his soul’ (57). Then she turns her eyes on him from 
the prisoners’ bench.  
‘Is it possible she recognized me?’ thought Nekhluyov in terror, feeling the blood 
rushing to his face; but Maslova immediately turned away, without 
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distinguishing him from the others, and again fixed her eyes anxiously on the 
assistant prosecutor.’ (64)  
 
When the court goes into recess, Tolstoy tells in flashback the story of the 
seduction, and 25 pages later we re-enter court, privy to Nekhluyov’s knowledge 
and agonized conscience. As part of that ‘complex, painful process’ alluded to, 
Nekhluyov’s moral discomfort has given way to something more urgent, 
compounding ‘terror’ with an acute self-consciousness. The terror is of exposure, 
of the nobleman recognized by his degraded victim, the high at the mercy of the 
low. The emotion succeeding the initial unmixed ‘terror’ is not named.  Instead, 
Tolstoy presents the prince’s consciousness of evolving bodily reactions. The 
context suggests both guilt and shame (Nekhluyov feels bad about what he has 
done but also fears for his reputation), or rather the precursors to these 
emotions, as well as the named terror. In the philosopher Robert Solomon’s 
(1993) terms, Nekhluyov’s reaction is a rapid judgment of his own responsibility 
for the woman’s fate and of the effect on him of the thought that others may 
come to know this. But with his customary penetration, Tolstoy emphasizes the 
priority of self-preservation over moral reflection, the endangered self over the 
endangered soul. The terror and the rush of blood are the urgent self-perception, 
not yet elaborated or consciously felt as shame and guilt.  
         The compressed power of the courtroom scene is slowly released in the 
action of the next 500 pages, so it matters to get it right. Tolstoy achieves his 
effect through narrative layering and minute observation of unfolding emotions. 
As readers, and perhaps as writers of non-fiction, we admire and despair. But the 
humble ethnographer can extract some encouragement. The lesson is to 
integrate emotion with action in sufficient narrative depth to capture those two 
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key aspects: its me-focus and its biographical import, the particularity of which 
makes emotion what it is and accounts for its social repercussions.  
        If we are interested in giving emotions their due, we have to work into our 
ethnography, as the best examples do, the confrontation between the teeming 
complexity of the world and the first-person perspective that reorders it: the 
capacity of emotions, as Solomon puts it, to constitute a world (1995: 41). Call it 
frame and focus or panoply and perspective: emotions seize what pertains to us; 
they respond to what external reality casts up in the way of frustration, loss, and 
opportunity; and they do so according to our dispositions, training, and history. 
Yet I want to insist that neither a phenomenological account nor a 
psychoanalytic one tells the whole story. For if, as Solomon has argued, an 
emotion is a judgment, an assessment of the circumstances affecting me, it’s also 
an action in a world made by others: a response – of pleasure, fear, or anger - to 
what lies beyond our control, to what disturbs our equilibrium, our goals and 
desires: the terrible figure in the witness box. And this tension between inner 
and outer imperatives – to overstate an opposition – must be at the heart of a 
fully anthropological account and can only be captured in narrative. The dialectic 
of provocation, judgment, response, and re-evaluation, however swift, is not the 
work of a moment. Life is a movie, not a snapshot.  
        In her book, Upheavals of Thought, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum has 
argued the case for a cognitive view of emotions, as opposed to (William) 
Jamesian theories, which make cognition secondary to visceral response. She 
differs from certain other cognitivists in rejecting a synchronic explanation that 
would ‘sever emotions from their past and depict them as fully and reliably 
determined by present input about one’s current situation’ (2001: 177).4 But her 
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point is equally applicable to constructionist accounts that ignore or compress 
the temporal dimension, which Nussbaum – as I do – takes to be essential.  ‘In a 
deep sense,’ she writes, ‘all human emotions are in part about the past, and bear 
traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed, and 
idiosyncratic’ (ibid.). Those three time-bound properties have been taken up in 
different kinds of inquiry: the commonly human in developmental psychology, 
the socially constructed in anthropology, and the idiosyncratic in fiction. In my 
view, all three belong in ethnography. Recall my deputy headman and his 
dynastic struggles. What history issued in that stifled speech of tribute and that 
puzzling rejuvenation?  The common human factors are thwarted ambition, 
sibling (or, rather, cousin) rivalry, personal offence, loss, and survival; factors 
which no doubt echo deeper childhood experiences. These ingredients of 
emotion are what psychologist Richard Lazarus (1994) calls ‘core relational 
themes’: the abstract scenarios that frame appraisals of situations and motivate 
emotions. Each of them in itself is a capsule story, a story basic to the human 
condition.  
        The socially constructed elements would include the record of feasting and 
ceremonial exchange that organize status competition among big men; but also 
ongoing tensions in the lineage cycle, such that cousins farming different tracts 
of shared land begin to assert individual control at the expense of rivals: a ready 
motive for murderous conflict. 
          The idiosyncratic history would be the dark memories of raiding and 
abduction, the repressed past out of which the dynastic struggle is spun. This 
history casts the deputy as Edmund to the chief’s Edgar, the natural talent 
against the legitimate heir, the man of words against the man of authority.5 As a 
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personal history, not a bare record of fact, it would include the hallmarks of 
character that shaped their rivalry for a generation: the chief’s wooden 
correctness, his booming certitude and simple piety; the deputy’s subtlety and 
resentment, his restless scepticism, and his capacity to surprise: the black hair 
and the white shorts.  
        Pan-human, culturally specific, idiosyncratic: I can tease apart the factors, 
but no account of the emotions at the deathbed scene could justly privilege one 
set over another. Take away one dimension and the whole thing collapses.  
 
With this hefty preamble, let me now specify in theoretical form how emotions 
implicate narrative, and vice versa; how they are made for each other.6  
          In the cognitivist view emotions are ‘intentional’ (Solomon 1980). One is 
not just angry, but angry at someone or about some state of affairs. (Objectless 
affects are moods.) Dissolve the object, alter the cognition, and the emotion 
vanishes. As Roberts (1988: 208) puts it, emotions are ‘concern-based construals 
of ourselves, others, and our situations’.7  
           A mere cognition does not necessarily imply much of a narrative. Simple 
emotions have simple objects. One is angry at having one’s rattle removed. One 
fears the wolf. But most emotions – and especially those with moral content like 
pride and regret - have a more complex structure. Shweder (1994: 37) and 
Goldie (2000:92) call it a narrative structure; psychologists refer to appraisals 
and relational themes. The linguist Anna Wierzbicka (1999) presents scripts for 
emotion words, showing how near-synonyms like ‘anger’ and ‘indignation' can 
be differentiated by their underlying scenarios. None of these authors (Goldie 
apart) allows much time-depth to the situational interpretation – of loss, danger, 
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or opportunity. The cognitive package is small. For my purposes, however, it is 
enough to recognize that in the cognition one grasps a meaningful temporal 
sequence; and that, in the interesting cases, the sequence links persons in moral 
frames and reverberates with prior encounters and stories; that the swift 
narrative of contextual interpretation draws from deeper currents, stories 
within stories.8 
        A second sense in which emotion implicates narrative is that people refer to 
shame, guilt, and hope to explain past and predict future behaviour. ‘He hung his 
head in shame.’ ‘She felt gratitude for the gift.’ ‘Clear up the mess, your father will 
be angry!’ An attributed emotion is like a chapter heading: we know, roughly 
what follows. This is not only because emotion words encode scripts but 
because, as Frijda (2004) has taught us, emotions comprise action tendencies. 
          A third connection points to the discursive role of emotion. Anthropologists 
have done most to show how emotions are manipulated in speech, performed for 
audiences, and used to persuade, evade, and dominate. Research in Pacific 
societies has shown how emotion talk provides an idiom for political activity, 
both as a tool of negotiation and as a reflection on political processes (Lutz and 
Abu-Lughod 1990, White and Kirkpatrick 1985). In looking at oratory in Nias, I 
found that heart idioms – hearts that were ‘scorched’, ‘squeezed’, or ‘heavy’ – 
function as tactical levers in debate, winning concessions and fending off 
demands. Cardiac idioms make up a rhetoric of moral suasion rather than a folk 
psychology or theory of the person (Beatty 2012). Whether that disqualifies 
them as emotion words is another question. They are certainly enacted with 
passion; they provoke an emotional response; and they imply action tendencies, 
which is why they have rhetorical force. All of these tactical and performative 
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uses of passion imply story-like structures and call, in turn, for narrative 
treatment.  
       A fourth connection derives from the patterning of social life. Michael 
Carrithers (1992: 159-170) has eloquently shown how our capacity to operate 
across cultural boundaries, or indeed, within them, depends on our skill at 
reading situations, grasping the plot, and recognizing – or constructing in turn - 
the narratives that give shape to events. Emotions would qualify as a special, 
highly developed, instance of the capacity to construe form, motive, backstory, 
personal relevance, and consequence: whether in the snap judgment of a jealous 
glance or the more deeply pondered apprehensions of hatred, love, and regret. 
Due to their constitutive particularity, however, emotions are especially liable to 
misconstruction by outsiders, and for this detailed narrative is the only remedy. 
For the same reasons, by filling the gaps that synchronic analysis leaves as 
mysteries, narrative supplies a defence against the more extravagant claims of 
cultural relativism - the outlandish emotions that could exist in some parallel 
universe but in practice don’t.  
      Fifth, as thinkers going back to Aristotle have pointed out, narratives are 
mostly about emotion-eliciting situations, reversals of fortune (Bruner 1990). 
       Finally, and most importantly, emotions, I have argued, have a time-depth 
and a biographical resonance that elude synchronic analysis.  A grasp of the 
narrative structure of emotion illuminates not only the tangle of pressures and 
constraints (those specific to individual characters, those that go with role) but 
also the possibilities inherent in the situation that the person feeling emotion 
registers and weighs. A narrative account allows for the subjective experience of 
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free will – however we want to qualify it - and the possibility of reflexive moral 
action. 
      Several arguments can be made against a narrative approach to emotion. I 
shall deal with them briefly. First, and most radical, is the claim that there is no 
valid cross-cultural category of emotion in the first place – therefore nothing to 
narrate (Beatty 2013, Shweder 1994, Wierzbicka 1999, Wilce 2009: 36-8).9 
There are feelings, thoughts, interpretations, and responses; but only in Western 
thought do they cohere as the package we call emotion. Most languages lack a 
superordinate emotion category. English words like ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’ find no 
exact matches. As Wierzbicka (1999:3) puts it, English doesn’t carve nature at its 
joints. Yet, as she shows, descriptive definition, if not word-for-word translation, 
is always possible. And this possibility depends on deeper affinities that 
undercut linguistic relativism: for the elements of appraisal, feeling, and 
response do, in practice, hang together, suggesting that emotions are fuzzy 
categories with real world correlates. The French concept of sentiment or the 
Javanese rasa – different in shape but overlapping in substance – could equally 
serve as starting points for cross-cultural comparison. We can come at the 
problem from different angles. Nature’s joints, as it turns out, are quite flexible.  
        But I would go further and assert that – whatever their ontological status as 
cultural inventions, biological states, or constructed social roles – emotions are 
unified experiences; and this subjective unity, which bears heavily on social 
processes, is due to their conceptual or narrative structure as construals of 
personal situations (Goldie 2012, Roberts 1988, Shweder 1994, Solomon 1993). 
We can leave the neuroscientists to quarrel over the milliseconds separating 
appraisal, visceral feedback and action-readiness, and the order in which they 
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occur, rather as we marvel at physicists arguing over the moments following the 
Big Bang. Our job is to get the experience right and to work out its significance in 
the stream of life - to recover the imponderabilia.  
         A second objection to a narrative approach might depend on a rejection of 
narrative rather than emotion. On this view, it would be ethnocentric to apply 
one to the other because some people – like the Yolmo of Nepal – favour 
imagistic accounts of experience; or because, like Mead’s Samoans, they avoid 
psychological explanations of behaviour; or, like certain other Pacific groups, 
affirm the ‘opacity of other minds’ (Desjarlais 1992, Hollan and Throop 2011, 
Mead 1972). This objection strictly applies to interpretive genres; it doesn’t alter 
the fact that people everywhere link characters and events in plots to comment, 
explain, predict, and blame. This is true whether cause and effect apply to ego 
and id, partible persons, the stars, humours, or vengeful gods. And it remains 
true, whether narrative looms large as epic, small as anecdote, or hides in 
accusations and excuses. For, as Bruner (1990) and Carrithers (1992) have 
shown, narrative is integral to sociality. So too, of course, is emotion; and so is 
each to the other, since anger, hope, and regret are forms of explaining, 
predicting, and judging. Whether we think in pictures or stories, resist or relish 
mind-reading, speak as we or I, love or loathe anecdotes, we are all narrators 
because we all have emotions; and emotions tell their own story. As 
ethnographers we should never forget the fact.  
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1 Emotion leaves few areas untouched: this essay is necessarily selective. 
Questions of epistemology, reflexivity, affect theory, human development, and 
political economy in emotion research are considered in Beatty 2005a, 2005b, 
2010, 2012, 2013, forthcoming.   
2 Firth (1985: 35) identifies ‘areas of similar basic experience of the external 
world’ as a key to the intelligibility of his example. Carrithers (1992: 159-161) 
refers to our grasp of a ‘universal pattern’ in ‘the basic idea’ that Rangifuri was 
‘upset’ and in ‘distress’ (166). I want to ask, what kind of distress? How was his 
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acting teke (‘angry’, ‘objecting’) conceived, felt, shared, resisted, or ignored? Only 
a fuller narrative could tell us why or whether Rangifuri’s father didn’t share his 
grief; how, given the apparent depth of feeling, Rangifuri and the chief could be 
so swiftly reconciled; and what were the chief’s own sentiments towards the 
dead youth, his ultimate heir. To these ethnographic questions basic patterns 
provide no answers. Firth’s account is too laconic and schematic to dispel the 
mysteries or illuminate the nature of teke. While I follow Carrithers in endorsing 
narrative as an ethnographic tool, when it comes to emotion I place less trust in 
‘consensible patterns’ or the common ground of experience (Beatty 2005a, 
2010). My argument will be that such common denominators – by definition – 
give small insight into the specificity and diversity of emotion. 
3 Cohen (1994: 16) puts it well: ‘My objection to the kind of generalization in 
which we indulged is that it has little or no authenticity in our own experience. 
Therefore I do not see how we can be content with it as an account of other 
people.’ In similar vein, Abu-Lughod (1991: 157) advocates (and exemplifies) 
‘narrative ethnographies of the particular’, which would reflect the fact that 
‘particulars, which are always present (as we know from our own personal 
experiences), are also always crucial to the constitution of experience’. For a 
recent discussion see Rapport 2010. 
4 Among her targets is Solomon, though his position does take past occurrences 
into account (and in a way I find congenial): ‘Every emotion is a judgment that 
presupposes the entire body of previous emotional judgments to supply its           
context and its history as well as “paradigm cases” for it to consider if not follow’ 
(Solomon 1993: 137).  
5 Idiosyncratic, but also culturally shaped and, in Carrithers’ (1992) term, cross-
culturally ‘consensible’.  
6 It will be clear that I am not just talking about narrative as text, but the 
narrative structure of emotions as construals of events. This is not the place for a 
discussion of narratology. In Beatty 2010 I consider the historians’ debates on 
narrative and cognition with reference to emotion.  
7 The insight goes back to Magda Arnold, fifty years ago, and ultimately to 
Aristotle. ‘To arouse an emotion, the object must be appraised as affecting me in 
some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my particular 
experience and my particular aims’ (Arnold, cited in Parkinson 1994: 6). It 
gained anthropological formulation in Rosaldo’s (1984) conception of emotions 
as ‘embodied thoughts’, and ethnographic illustration in claims, for example, that 
Balinese and Ifaluk people make no distinction between feeling and thinking 
(Wikan 1990: 35-37; Lutz 1988: 92) – a translation confusion, according to 
Wierzbicka (1999: 278-9). In fact the notion that thought and feeling are 
indistinct in non-Western traditions is an exoticizing version of the view now 
widely held in philosophy and cognitive psychology that feeling and thinking are 
closely interwoven, for example, in moral reasoning and in the subjective 
experience of emotion (Barrett et al. 2007: 390). 
8 Time-depth varies between emotions (surprise, love) - and between theorists. 
For Ekman, emotions happen over seconds or minutes (1994:16). Goldie sees 
emotions not as events but processes that may unfold over years (conceptually 
distinct from briefer component episodes) (2000:12-14; 69; 2012: 61-4). I would 
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prefer to distinguish between dispositions (e.g. to love someone) and occurrent 
emotions (to experience a surge of love) (Ben Ze’ev 2010: 55).  
9 The psychological and philosophical literature on this question is extensive. For 
overviews, see Russell 1991, Goldie 2010. For current debates, see the 
interdisciplinary journal Emotion Review. 
Following the editor’s emails of 17 and 18 December, 
I have made the additions advised, in sentences and 
footnotes at various places: pp. 9, 12, 20, 26, 
endnotes 1 & 6. I found I couldn't do all this in a 
single paragraph, so it made sense to allocate the 
points at relevant places. I hope this now supplies 
enough information "situating this argument in 
relation to your other published and forthcoming work 
on emotion". The additions also signal other people’s 
work and topics not considered in the article but 
reviewed by me elsewhere. All additions are 
highlighted in yellow. I have made a few cosmetic 
cuts to allow space for these additions. The total 
word count, including Abstract, is 10,594: just under 
the 10,600 you kindly permitted me. 
 
Responses to Reviewers
